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COMMENTS

WILL CHARLIE BROWN FINALLY KICK THE FOOTBALL?:
MISSOURI ENACTS THE NEXT GENERATION OF PARTIAL
BIRTH ABORTION RESTRICTIONS

The post-Casey history of abortion litigation in the lower courts is
reminiscent of the classic recurring football drama of Charlie Brown and Lucy
in the Peanuts comic strip. Lucy repeatedly assures Charlie Brown that he can
kick the football, if only this time he gets it just right. Charlie Brown keeps
trying, but Lucy never fails to pull the ball away at the last moment.1

Missouri, like Charlie Brown, has shown remarkable persistence,
determination and singleness of purpose, while trying to kick the legislative
“football.” The lower federal courts, like Lucy, smile reassuringly and invite
another attempt. The Peanuts characters live forever unchanged. Charlie
Brown begins wary but eventually trusting and even confident. Lucy is
beguiling and convincing, yet in the end always unreliable.
Missouri is no Charlie Brown. Among all the states, Missouri has
demonstrated a willingness to aggressively legislate life issues at either end of
the spectrum.2 The lower courts are not Lucy, forever fated to deceive and
frustrate the states’ attorney generals. The split among the courts reflects the
split that exists among the justices of the Supreme Court.
This Article examines Missouri’s novel effort to ban what is commonly
known as “partial birth abortion.” It is an obvious attempt to navigate the
murky judicial waters surrounding any legislation having the effect of
proscribing or limiting a woman’s reproductive rights. The Article examines
1. Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 218 (6th Cir. 1997) (Boggs, J.,
dissenting) (referring to the seeming impossibility for states to ever satisfy the courts’ vague
standards for regulating abortions).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 231-34; see also Cruzan v. Missouri Dep’t of Health,
497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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the medico-legal issues arising from the procedure sought to be banned.
Finally, the author examines how the courts are likely to view the Missouri
statute.
I. MISSOURI PASSES AN INFANTICIDE BAN TO PROHIBIT SOME ABORTIONS
After several attempts in previous years to pass a partial birth abortion bill,
the Missouri general assembly successfully passed the Infant’s Protection Act
on September 16, 1999, overriding the Democratic governor’s veto.3 It was
only the seventh time in Missouri history that a governor’s veto was
overturned and the first since 1980.4 While the proposed legislation ignited the
usual controversy among pro-life and pro-choice supporters, the final
legislative vote was nonpartisan.5 In fact, a legislature controlled by democrats
overrode the democratic governor’s veto.6
For the past several years, legislatures at both the state and federal level
have attempted to pass partial birth abortion bans.7 While thirty states have
currently enacted some form of partial birth abortion legislation, Missouri’s

3. Judy Peres, Judge Puts Missouri Abortion Ban on Pause: “Partial Birth” Laws Raise
New Challenges, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 18, 1999, at 3. The governor issued a statement detailing his
objections to the bill. His primary justifications for vetoing the bill included the following: 1) the
bill could be read so as to ban “some of the safest and most commonplace first and second
trimester abortion procedures,” 2) the ban “fails to include an exception for medical emergencies
or for preserving the health of the mother,”and 3) the bill “criminalizes innocent women who are
forced to make difficult health decisions. More specifically, the bill provides for severe criminal
penalties – including sentences of up to life in prison,” and finally the ban “fails to include an
exception for rape or incest.” Statement from Gov. Carnahan Re: Veto of H.B. 427 (visited on
Feb. 27, 2000) <http://www.missourilife.org/veto/excuses.htm>.
4. Stephanie Simon, Abortion Law Sets Life Terms for Women, MDs, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17,
1999, at A1; Bill Bell, Jr., The Moment of Truth is Here for the Abortion Measure, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 12, 1999, at A8. Interestingly, the bill was sponsored in the House and
championed in the Senate by two democrats: Representative Bill Luetkenhaus and Senator Ted
House. Simon, supra at A1. In a CNN interview following the override vote, Senator House
commented that he was “especially proud of all of [his] fellow Democrats, many of them prochoice, who decided to put principle over politics and to draw the line between abortion and
infanticide.” Interview by Judy Woodruff with Senator House, of the Missouri Senate (Sept. 17,
1999).
5. Simon, supra note 4, at A1.
6. Will Sentell, Court Blocks State’s New Law: Missouri Abortion Limits Put On Hold,
KANSAS CITY STAR, Sept. 18, 1999, at A1. The House voted 127-34, with 50 of the 86 House
Democrats joining every House Republican in support of the bill. Simon, supra note 4, at A1.
The Senate voted 27-7, with 11 of 18 Senate Democrats joining every Senate Republican in
voting to override the governor’s veto. Id.
7. See Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995, H.R. 1833, 104th Cong. (1995) (vetoed on
April 9, 1996); Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1997, H.R. 1122, 106th Cong. (1997) (vetoed
on October 10, 1997).
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law has received national attention.8 Unlike previous legislation, Missouri’s
Infant’s Protection Act9 creates the felony crime of infanticide, without
reference to “abortion.”10 The law is the first in the nation to provide criminal
penalties, from ten years to life imprisonment, for both pregnant women and
physicians.11 Additionally, while it contains an exception to save the life of the
mother or the life of any child of the same pregnancy, many of the bill’s
opponents criticize the lack of an exception for the health of the mother.12 Prochoice advocates contend that the law is so vaguely worded that it could
outlaw most of the abortions in the state, and not simply the late term
procedure known as “partial birth abortion” or “dilation and extraction.”13 It is
important to note, however, that the bill specifically states that the ban “shall
not apply to any person who performs or attempts to perform a legal abortion if
the act that causes the death is performed prior to the child being partially
born,14 even though the death of the child occurs as a result of the abortion
after the child is partially born.”15

8. National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League Foundation, Bans on SoCalled “Partial-Birth” Abortion and Other Abortion Procedures (visited Feb. 28, 2000)
<http://www.naral.org/publications/2000/charts_bans.html> [hereinafter Bans on So-Called
“Partial Birth” Abortion] (listing the following states as having passed partial birth abortion
legislation: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin); Bell, supra note 4, at A8; Sentell, supra note 6, at A1.
9. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.300 (1999).
10. “A person is guilty of the crime of infanticide if such person causes the death of a living
infant with the purpose to cause said death by an overt act performed when the infant is partially
born or born.” Id. § 565.300.3. “The crime of infanticide shall be a class A felony.” Id. §
565.300.4.
11. Bell, supra note 4, at A8; Peres, supra note 3, at 3.
12. Peres, supra note 3, at 3. “A physician using procedures consistent with the usual and
customary standards of medical practice to save the life of the mother during pregnancy or birth
or to save the life of any unborn or partially born child of the same pregnancy shall not be
criminally responsible under this section.” MO. REV. STAT. § 565.300.5 (emphasis added). In
an interview with CNN, Senator House claimed that “the reason that the vast majority of the
members of the House and the Senate in Missouri rejected the health exception is that [the
Infant’s Protection Act] is an infanticide bill and there’s no health exception to infanticide.”
Interview by Greta van Susteren with Senator House, of the Missouri Senate (Sept. 20, 1999).
13. Bell, supra note 4, at A8.
14. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.300.6 (emphasis added). “Partially born” is defined in the statute
as “partial separation of a child from the mother with the child’s head intact with the torso.” Id. §
565.300.2(3). A child is partially separated when the “head . . . or any part of the torso above the
navel in a breech presentation, is outside the mother’s external cervical os.” Id. Also see infra
text accompanying notes 249-62.
15. Id. § 565.300.6. Supporters of the bill insist that this provision was added so as to make
clear that the law does not affect legalized abortions on previable fetuses. Bell, supra note 4, at
A8.
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On September 17, 1999, the day after the Missouri General Assembly
voted to override the governor’s veto, Reproductive Health Services of
Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region Inc., and Dr. Robert Crist obtained
a restraining order from U.S. District Judge Scott Wright16 in Kansas City,
Missouri.17 Trial had originally been scheduled to begin in federal district
court on March 27, 2000; however, the state succeeded in remanding the case
to a St. Louis circuit court.18 Ruling for the first time on the constitutionality
of partial birth abortion statutes, the Eighth Circuit struck down statutes in
Nebraska, Iowa, and Arkansas on September 24, 1999, for placing an undue
burden on women seeking other types of abortions.19
The majority of federal circuit courts to review partial birth abortion
legislation have found such statutes unconstitutional,20 although a minority of
federal circuit courts have upheld similar statutes.21 Interestingly, not all state
partial birth abortion statutes have been challenged in court, and many are
currently enforceable.22 Planned Parenthood notes that those enforceable laws

16. Judge Wright, an appointee of Jimmy Carter, has presided over several controversial
abortion cases. His decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, declaring several
portions of Missouri’s 1986 abortion regulations unconstitutional, was overturned by the Supreme
Court in 1989. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). Pro-life supporters of the Infant’s Protection Act were
pessimistic about their chances at the trial court level given Judge Wright’s history of striking
down abortion regulations. Will Sentell, Reversal of Abortion Measure Expected, KANSAS CITY
STAR, Oct. 1, 1999. In a telephone interview, Representative Luetkenhaus cheerfully quipped
that many at the capital believe that, “Seventy-five percent of the time Judge Wright is wrong.”
Telephone Interview with Representative Luetkenhaus, of the Missouri House of Representatives
(Mar. 1, 2000).
17. Sentell, supra note 6, at A1.
18. Bill Bell, Jr., Federal Court Challenge Delays Enforcement of New Missouri Abortion
Law Until March, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 23, 1999, at B3; Hearing on Missouri
Infanticide Law is Postponed by Federal Appeals Court, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 25,
2000.
19. Tim Bryant, 3 “Partial-birth Abortion” Laws Fall: Court Rejects 3 “Partial-birth
Abortion” Bans, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 25, 1999, at 6. See also Carhart v. Stenberg,
192 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1999); Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa v. Miller, 195 F.3d 386 (8th
Cir. 1999); Little Rock Family Planning Servs. v. Jegley, 192 F.3d 794 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting
that the differences between the statutes are not significant to the court’s analysis).
20. See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 187; Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1142; Miller, 195 F.3d at 386;
Jegley, 192 F.3d at 796.
21. Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999) (upholding both the Wisconsin and
Illinois partial birth abortion bans). See also Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin v. Doyle, 44 F.
Supp.2d 975 (W.D. Wisc. 1999); Summit Medical v. James, 984 F. Supp. 1404 (M.D. Ala. 1998)
(interpreting the statute to only apply to viable fetuses); Midtown Hosp. v. Miller, 36 F. Supp.2d
1360 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (pursuant to a court-ordered settlement, the application of the law’s ban is
limited to the D&X abortion procedure on viable fetuses and includes an exception for abortions
necessary to preserve the mother’s life or health).
22. Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., State Laws Restricting Access to
Abortion 26 years after Roe v. Wade (visited Oct. 12, 1999) <http://www.plannedparenthood.org/
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have broad health exceptions and are clearly limited to only cover viable
fetuses.23
Missouri’s Infant’s Protection Act raises important constitutional questions
with respect to the legality of partial birth abortion statutes under current
abortion case law and whether this statute may avoid invoking abortion law by
classifying the banned procedure as “infanticide” as opposed to abortion. Part
II explores the confusion surrounding the definition and advisability of partial
birth abortion techniques. Part III explains the current framework posed by the
Supreme Court for scrutinizing abortion regulations. Part IV describes federal
and state decisions on partial birth abortion legislation and the specific
problems with those statutes determined to be unconstitutional. Part V
analyzes Missouri’s Infant’s Protection Act in light of current case law on
partial birth abortion, whether Missouri’s law significantly differs from
previous state statutes, and whether Missouri’s law will survive constitutional
scrutiny. Part VI proposes changes in Missouri’s current ban.
II. WHY THE CONTROVERSY OVER PARTIAL BIRTH ABORTION?
According to the American Medical Association (AMA), “partial birth
abortion” is not a medical term and is not used by the AMA.24 The general
public, however, generally uses the term to refer to a specific abortion
procedure know as “intact dilation and extraction” (D&X). This procedure
consists of the following steps: “[1)] deliberate dilation of the cervix, usually
over a sequence of days, [2)] instrumental or manual conversion of the fetus to
a footling breech, [3)] breech extraction of the body excepting the head, and
[4)] partial evacuation of the intra-cranial contents of the fetus to effect vaginal
delivery of a dead but otherwise intact fetus.”25 Much of the controversy
surrounding this procedure is related to its graphic and disturbing description,
as well as conflicting accounts of the frequency of the procedure. Most
disturbing is the fact that by the third trimester the fetal skull is so large that
the physician must crush it, remove the brain tissue, and collapse the skull to
remove the fetus completely from the woman.26

library/ABORTION.StateLaws.html> [hereinafter State Laws Restricting Access to Abortion].
Currently some form of partial-birth abortion legislation is enforceable in Alabama, Georgia,
Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia. Bans on So-Called “Partial-Birth” Abortion, supra note 8.
23. See State Laws Restricting Access to Abortion, supra note 22.
24. American Medical Association Policy Finder H-5.982, Late-Term Pregnancy
Termination Techniques (visited Jan. 23, 2000) <http://www.ama-assn.org> [hereinafter LateTerm Pregnancy Termination Techniques].
25. Id.
26. Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 198-99. In Hope Clinic v. Ryan, the Seventh Circuit commented
on the source of the controversy:
It is this combination of coming so close to delivering a live child with the death of the
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The AMA insists that while the D&X procedure is a variation of the
dilation and evacuation (D&E) procedure more commonly used to induce
abortion after the first trimester, it is a distinct and distinguishable procedure.27
Dilation and evacuation is the most common abortion technique used between
twelve and twenty-three weeks.28 The D&X is generally performed after the
twenty-fourth week.29 In a D&E, the physician generally “dilates the cervix . . .
reaches into the uterus with an instrument and . . . using a combination of
suction [and traction] . . . removes the fetus . . . in parts.”30 During this stage
of development, the force of the traction easily tears the fetal tissue and the
fetal tissue is typically removed in parts. Later in the pregnancy, it becomes
nearly impossible to remove the fetus in parts using the D&E procedure. In
contrast with the D&E, abortion providers using the D&X procedure generally
remove an intact fetus that has progressed in fetal development.
The AMA recognizes that “there does not appear to be any identified
situation in which [the] intact D&X is the only appropriate procedure to induce
abortion”31 and recommends that the D&X procedure not be used unless
alternative procedures pose a materially greater risk to the woman.32 The AMA
further suggests that abortions not be performed in the third trimester, except in
cases of serious “fetal anomalies incompatible with life.”33
fetus by reducing the size of the skull that not only distinguishes D&X from D&E
medically but also causes the adverse public (and legislative) reaction. Opponents deem
the D&X procedure needlessly cruel and bordering on infanticide.
Ryan, 195 F.3d at 862.
27. Late-Term Pregnancy Termination Techniques, supra note 24. While the AMA agrees
that the D&X and D&E procedures are, in fact, distinct from one another, widespread confusion
continues in interpreting “partial birth abortion” statutes that do not clearly name or specifically
define the procedure they intend to outlaw. Rather than use medical descriptions of specific
steps involved in the banned procedure, most statutes use general descriptions that some doctors
interpret as encompassing both procedures. Critics of these “general statutes” claim that the
legislatures intended the language to be confusingly broad so as to proscribe the vast majority of
abortions. See State Laws Restricting Access to Abortion, supra note 22.
28. R. I. Med. Soc’y v. Whitehouse, 66 F. Supp.2d 288, 296 (D.R.I. 1999).
29. Id. at 297.
30. Id. at 296.
31. See Late-Term Pregnancy Termination Techniques, supra note 24.
32. Id. The AMA did support H.R. 1122, the most recent federal attempt to ban partial-birth
abortion. In a letter to Senator Rick Santorum, the Executive Vice President of the American
Medical Association emphasized, “[a]lthough our general policy is to oppose legislation
criminalizing medical practice or procedure, the AMA has supported such legislation where the
procedure was narrowly defined and not medically indicated. HR 1122 now meets both these
tests.” Letter from P. John Seward, M.D. to Senator Rick Santorum (May 19, 1997) (on file with
author).
33. See Late-Term Pregnancy Termination Techniques, supra note 24; Planned Parenthood
of Central N.J. v. Verniero, 41 F. Supp.2d 478, 483 n.1 (D.N.J. 1998) (noting expert testimony
explaining that the “risk of death from abortion increases about thirty percent with each week of
gestation from eight weeks . . . to twenty weeks . . . [and] that the risk of major medical
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The actual number of late-term abortions using the D&X procedure is
difficult to quantify because of incomplete data and a flawed collection
process.34 The most scientifically reliable national data on the incidence of
abortion come from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and
the Alan Guttmacher Institute (AGI).35 The CDC derives its data primarily
from reports by state departments, whereas the AGI collects data directly from
abortion providers.36 For many years, the AGI’s estimates of the number of
abortions performed each year have been higher and considered to be more
accurate than CDC estimates.37 Unfortunately the AGI does not collect data on
gestational age.38 While the CDC does collect data on gestational age, it
neither differentiates between the D&X and D&E procedures nor reports
abortion frequency by gestational age beyond twenty-one weeks.39 Despite
these limitations, data show that ninety-five percent of induced abortions are
performed at or before fifteen weeks.40 The estimated number of abortions
performed beyond twenty-one weeks is 16,450 per year.41
The legal definition of viability, first articulated in Roe v. Wade,42 refers to
“the capacity for meaningful life outside the mother’s womb, albeit with
artificial aid.”43 The Supreme Court has often emphasized that the attending
physician is in the best position to determine viability in light of current
complications increases about twenty percent with each week of gestation from seven weeks . . .
to full term”).
34. M. LeRoy Sprang, M.D. & Mark G. Neerhof, D.O., Rationale for Banning Abortions
Late in Pregnancy, 280 JAMA 744 (1998).
35. Janet E. Gans Epner, Ph.D. et al., Late-term Abortion, 280 JAMA 724 (1998).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. The CDC reports a combined number for all abortions performed beyond 21 weeks,
however more specific information is relevant given the continued dispute as to the gestational
age of viability. Epner, supra note 35, at 726. Like the CDC, the Missouri Department of Health
only reports a combined number for all abortions performed beyond 21 weeks of gestation. In
addition, while it has been documented that 733 D&E abortions were performed in 1998, the
Missouri Department of Health does not have a category for reporting D&X abortions. Without
such a category, it cannot be conclusively determined whether D&X abortions have been
performed in Missouri. Interestingly, 118 “other” abortions and 11 “unknown” abortions have
been reported. It may be the case that doctors are performing D&X procedures and simply
reporting them under the “other” or “unknown” category. Table 12: Resident Abortions By Race,
Age of Woman and Type of Procedure by Weeks of Gestation (visited Feb. 28, 2000)
<http://www.health.state.mo.us/Publications/Table12.html> [hereinafter Table 12].
40. Epner, supra note 35, at 726. Missouri statistics are consistent with national data.
Ninety-four percent of Missouri abortions (11,987) are performed prior to 15 weeks of fetal
development. Table 12, supra note 39.
41. Epner, supra note 35, at tbl. 2. In Missouri, 113 fetuses over 21 weeks gestation were
aborted in 1998. Table 12, supra note 39.
42. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
43. Id. at 160; Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 63 (1976).
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medical technology.44 “Viability is presumed to exist after twenty-seven
weeks gestation . . . and is presumed not to exist prior to twenty weeks. The
time between twenty and twenty-seven weeks is a ‘gray zone’ in which some
fetuses may be viable and others are not.”45 The D&X procedure is most often
performed between twenty and twenty-four weeks and raises, therefore, the
question of potential viability of the fetus.46 Data reveal that fetal survival
rates at twenty-four weeks ranges from 56% to 83% and survival rates at
twenty-five weeks ranges from 79% to 89%.47
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN SUPREME COURT ABORTION DECISIONS
The origins of privacy and procreative rights began with the Supreme
Court’s decision in Griswold v. Connecticut.48 The Court asserted that the
substantive due process protections in the Bill of Rights includes a “zone of
privacy” that cannot be invaded by governmental regulation.49 The zone of
privacy recognized in Griswold prevented a Connecticut law prohibiting
contraceptive use from invading a married couple’s decisions regarding
reproductive prevention.50 The Court later expanded that zone of reproductive
privacy to include unmarried couples.51
In Roe v. Wade,52 the Supreme Court first recognized that the
constitutionally protected right of privacy “is broad enough to encompass a
woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”53 When state
regulations affect protected fundamental rights, such as the right of privacy, the
Court strictly scrutinizes such regulations and upholds such restrictions only if
justified by a “compelling state interest.”54 In Roe v. Wade, the Court struck
down a Texas law that prohibited all abortions, except when necessary to save
the life of the mother.55 Although the state statute was declared
unconstitutional, the Court nevertheless qualified their decision by observing
that a woman’s right to choose an abortion is not absolute and the state has an

44. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 64 (“[V]iability [is] a matter of medical judgment, skill, and
technical ability.”); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387-88 (1979).
45. Epner, supra note 35, at 727. According to estimates, “the number of abortions
performed after 26 weeks nationwide is estimated between 320 and 600.” Id.
46. Sprang, supra note 34, at 746. See also Roe, 410 U.S. at 160 (1973) (“[V]iability is
usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks.”).
47. Sprang, supra note 34, at 745.
48. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
49. Id. at 484.
50. Id.
51. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
52. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
53. Id. at 153.
54. Id. at 155.
55. Id. at 164.
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interest in protecting the potential life of a fetus.56 According to the Court, the
fetus does not become a full “person” for purposes of Fourteenth Amendment
protection until birth.57
Recognizing the competing interests of the woman and the state, the Court
established the trimester framework to guide in the balance of those interests.
During the first trimester, the woman’s right to privacy and to choose an
abortion outweighs all state interests and she may elect to terminate her
pregnancy without any interference or regulation by the state.58 During the
second trimester, the government may regulate, but not ban, abortions in ways
that are reasonably related to maternal health.59 By the third trimester or at the
point of viability, the State’s interest in potential life becomes “compelling.”60
Once a fetus has the “capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s
womb,” the State may proscribe abortions, except when “necessary to preserve
the life or health61 of the mother.”62
Although the Supreme Court has not yet reviewed the constitutionality of a
partial birth abortion statute or late term abortion ban, it once considered a
Missouri statute prohibiting the use of a particular abortion procedure.63 In
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,64 the Court struck down a ban on saline
56. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54. “[A]ppellant . . . argue[s] that the woman’s right is absolute
and that she is entitled to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way, and for
whatever reason she alone chooses. With this we do not agree.” Id. at 153.
57. Id. at 158. The Court specifically rejected the argument that the fetus is a “person” from
the moment of conception. In doing so, the Court relied heavily on the observation that “[i]n
areas other than criminal abortion, the law has been reluctant to endorse any theory that life, as
we recognize it, begins before live birth or to accord legal rights to the unborn except in narrowly
defined situations and except when the rights are contingent upon live birth.” Id. at 159-61. It
should be noted, however, that the premise upon which the Court relies has drastically changed as
state courts have recognized a fetus as a person under criminal and tort law. See discussion infra
Part V.D.1.
58. Id. at 163.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. The Court does not fully explain what is meant by the term “health” in Roe. See
generally Roe, 410 U.S. at 113. The Court did, however, agree with a district court’s
interpretation of a Georgia abortion law’s “health exception” in Doe v. Bolton, Roe’s companion
case. In Doe, the Court acknowledged that a physician’s medical decision to abort a pregnancy to
protect the health of a woman “may be exercised in light of all factors – physical, emotional,
psychological, familial, and the woman’s age – relevant to the well being of the patient. All these
factors may relate to health.” Id. at 192 (emphasis added).
62. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64. The Court goes on to note that the Roe decision “leaves the
State free to place increasing restrictions on abortion as the period of pregnancy lengthens, so
long as those restrictions are tailored to the recognized state interests.” Id. at 165.
63. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a Nebraska “partial birth abortion” ban
during the 2000 spring term. Stenberg v. Carhart, 192 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. granted,
68 U.S.L.W. 3338 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2000) (No. 99-830). See discussion infra Part VII.
64. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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amniocentesis abortions, finding that the law would have banned one of the
more common and safer second trimester abortion procedures.65 The Court
determined that the ban was not reasonably related to the protection of the
mother’s health, given that the effect of the ban on saline amniocentesis would
require a woman seeking an abortion to “terminate her pregnancy by methods
more dangerous to her health than the method outlawed.”66 Danforth was
decided using the more rigid trimester standard set forth in Roe67 and placed
particular emphasis on the state’s motive in passing a ban on a relatively safe
procedure.68 Following the Roe trimester framework, a state may regulate
abortions during the second trimester; however, the regulations must be related
to protecting a woman’s health and may not be detrimental to a woman
choosing to undergo an abortion.69
While continuing to uphold the importance of protecting a woman’s life
and health in the abortion decision, the Court has also upheld state and federal
laws limiting financial access to abortions.70 A state may refuse to fund some
elective and “medically necessary” abortions.71 In Harris v. McRae, the Court
upheld the Hyde Amendment, a federal statute that withholds federal Medicaid
funding for some medically necessary abortions.72 The Court has also held
that a Medicaid participating state need not fund all medically necessary
abortions for its citizens given that the Hyde Amendment precludes federal
reimbursement.73 While the freedom of a woman to choose to terminate her
pregnancy for health reasons has been acknowledged by the Court, “it simply
does not follow that a woman’s freedom of choice carries with it a

65. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 76-79. The Court found that the saline amniocentesis procedure
was “employed in a substantial majority (. . . from 68% to 80%) of all post-first-trimester
abortions.” Id.
66. Id. at 79.
67. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992). Casey
criticized the cases following Roe that found:
[A]ny regulation touching upon the abortion decision must survive strict scrutiny . . . . Not
all of the cases decided under that formulation can be reconciled with the holding in Roe
itself that the State has legitimate interests in the health of the woman and in protecting
the potential life within her. In resolving this tension, we choose to rely upon Roe, as
against the later cases.
Id.
68. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 76-79.
69. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-65.
70. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1979) (upholding a Connecticut regulation that denied
payments to Medicaid recipients receiving non-therapeutic abortions); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297 (1980) (finding prohibition of federal Medicaid funds for abortions other than to save the life
of the mother to be constitutional).
71. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1979); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
72. Harris, 448 U.S. at 312-18.
73. Id. at 326.
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constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself to the full
range of protected choices.”74
Reflecting its new conservative makeup, a majority of the Court upheld
Missouri’s comprehensive abortion law at issue in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services.75 The Court held that the “preamble” to the statute, declaring
that the life of each human being begins at conception, was a permissible value
judgment of the state.76 In viewing the “preamble” as a value judgment rather
than an abortion regulation, the Court declined to consider its
constitutionality.77 The Court did review and uphold a provision prohibiting
the use of public employees and public facilities in performing non-therapeutic
abortions.78 Finally, the Court upheld a requirement that a physician test a
fetus of at least twenty weeks in order to determine whether it is viable.79
Planned Parenthood v. Casey80 was the most recent abortion case
reviewed by the Supreme Court. In Casey, the Court reexamined state
regulation of abortions and reaffirmed the essential holding of Roe v. Wade in
a plurality opinion.81 Reasserting that a woman has a “right to terminate her
pregnancy before viability,” the Court ultimately discarded the rigid trimester
framework for evaluating governmental regulations established earlier in
Roe.82 Emphasizing the state’s legitimate interest in potential life throughout a
pregnancy, the Court concluded that “viability” should be the new standard for
evaluating abortion regulations such that a woman may choose to terminate her
pregnancy prior to viability.83 Once the fetus has attained viability, the

74. Id. at 316.
75. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
76. Id. at 504-06.
77. Id. at 506-07. The Court noted that:
The extent to which the preamble’s language might be used to interpret other state statutes
or regulations is something that only the courts of Missouri can definitely decide . . . . It
will be time enough for federal courts to address the meaning of the preamble should it be
applied to restrict the activities of appellees in some concrete way.
Id.
78. Id. at 507-10.
79. Webster, 492 U.S. at 517.
80. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
81. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
82. Id. at 871. The Court noted that the trimester framework had proven unworkable given
advances in neonatal care that push viability to an earlier point in fetal development. Id. at 860.
83. Id. at 870.
The concept of viability . . . is the time at which there is a realistic possibility of
maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb, so that the independent existence of
the second life can in reason and all fairness be the object of state protection that now
overrides the rights of the woman.
Id.
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“State’s interest in life has sufficient force so that the right of the woman to
terminate the pregnancy can be restricted.”84
While the Casey plurality reaffirmed the “essential holding of Roe,” it
significantly altered the constitutional analysis for a state abortion regulation.
Rather than being subject to Roe’s strict scrutiny standard, abortion restrictions
prior to viability are now permissible so long as they have a “rational basis”
and do not place an “undue burden” on a woman’s right to an abortion.85 A
state regulation that has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle
in the path of a woman’s choice to abort a nonviable fetus is an “undue
burden.” 86 Not all burdens will be deemed “substantial obstacles.”87 “[T]he
proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a
restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.”88
As to viable fetuses, a state may protect its interest in potential human life
by “regulat[ing], and even proscrib[ing], abortion except where it is necessary
. . . for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.”89 After Casey, a
key inquiry in analyzing the constitutionality of an abortion statute is whether
the law proscribes or regulates a previable or viable fetus. Many questions
remain as to how to correctly apply the new Casey standard. The Casey
analysis makes it difficult to know whether a regulation might be permissible
on its face, but an undue burden on an individual woman as applied.90 At some
points the Casey plurality refers to individuals, yet the plurality found a
restrictive spousal notification requirement to be an undue burden because it
affected “a significant number of women” and “for many women it will
impose a substantial obstacle.”91 This suggests that requirements that do not
adversely affect “many women” would be permissible even if they do
adversely affect a few.

84. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869. The Court further commented that “[i]n some broad sense it
might be said that a woman who fails to act before viability has consented to the State’s
intervention on behalf of the developing child.” Id. at 870.
85. Id. at 877-78. In evaluating Casey, it is important to recognize that the “undue burden”
standard has “no present legal doctrinal significance simply because a majority of the Court has
not adopted [it].” B. J. George Jr., J.D., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennyslvania [sic]
v. Casey: An Analysis, in ABORTION, MEDICINE, AND THE LAW xv, xvi (J. Douglas Butler &
David F. Walbert eds., 1992).
86. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. “The very notion that the State has a substantial interest in
potential life leads to the conclusion that not all regulations must be deemed unwarranted. Not all
burdens on the right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy will be undue.” Id. at 876.
87. Id. at 887.
88. Id. at 894.
89. Id. at 879 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973)).
90. See infra text accompanying notes 92-103.
91. Casey, 505 U.S. at 894-95.
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IV. CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS ARE SPLIT AS TO WHETHER “PARTIAL BIRTH
ABORTION” BANS ARE CONSTITUTIONAL.
A.

Standard of Review for Facial Challenge of Abortion Laws

The standard of review for “facial” and “applied” challenges to statutes is
particularly important in abortion litigation. If a statute is found to be
unconstitutional as applied, then the state may continue to enforce the statute in
such ways as are constitutional, whereas, if a statute is unconstitutional on its
face, then the state may not enforce the statute under any circumstances.92
Federal courts are divided on whether abortion statutes are subject to a
separate, stricter standard of review.93 Under the general rule,94 established in
United States v. Salerno,95 a court may only invalidate a law on a facial
challenge where “no set of circumstances exists under which [the law] would
be valid.”96 Many plaintiffs opposed to partial birth abortion legislation have
argued that the Supreme Court implicitly established a separate standard of
review for abortion laws in Casey.97 The Casey Court determined that an
abortion law that operates as a “substantial obstacle to a woman’s choice of
abortion in a large fraction of the cases in which it applies” will be declared
unconstitutional, even if the law has constitutional applications.98
Interestingly, both the circuit courts99 and the Supreme Court justices
dispute whether the Salerno standard has been replaced with Casey’s “undue
burden” standard in the abortion context.100 The majority of circuit courts have
held that the “undue burden” standard was central to the outcome in Casey
and, therefore, the “undue burden” standard controls in the abortion arena.101

92. Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 193 (6th Cir. 1997).
93. See infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
94. See R. I. Med. Soc’y v. Whitehouse, 66 F. Supp.2d 288, 312 (D.R.I. 1999) (discussing
Salerno’s general rule for facial challenges).
95. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
96. Id. (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).
97. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
98. Id. (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 894-95).
99. Id. at 312-13 (noting that the Eighth Circuit has found Salerno to be “effectively
overruled” while the Fifth Circuit continues to apply the Salerno standard).
100. See id. Justice O’Connor considers the Casey standard to be controlling, while Justice
Scalia considers the Salerno standard controlling. Id. Compare Ada v. Guam Soc’y of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disputing denial of
certiorari), with Fargo Women’s Health Org. v. Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013, 1014 (1993) (O’Connor,
J., concurring).
101. Compare Causeway Med. Suite v. Foster, 43 F. Supp.2d 604, 611-12 (E.D. La. 1999)
(acknowledging that the Salerno standard is inconsistent with the rule set forth in Casey, yet
continuing to apply the Salerno standard), and Manning v. Hunt, 119 F.3d 254, 268 n.4 (4th Cir.
1998), with Richmond Med. Ctr. v. Gilmore, 55 F. Supp.2d 441, 476-79 (E.D. Va. 1999), and
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The Sixth and Eighth Circuits “choose to follow what the Supreme Court
actually did – rather than what it failed to say – and apply the undue-burden
test.”102
While the majority of circuits have found the Casey “undue burden”
standard to provide the correct analytical framework for abortion legislation,
the circuits are also split as to whether the Casey standard applies only to laws
affecting previable abortions or to laws affecting both previable and viable
abortions.103 Therefore, partial birth abortion legislation limited solely to
viable fetuses may not be subject to the more difficult undue burden standard
established in Casey.
B.

The Sixth and Eighth Circuits, as Well as Several District Courts, Have
Found Partial Birth Abortion Legislation to be Unconstitutional on
Various Grounds

Many of the state partial birth abortion bans found to be unconstitutional
by federal judges were based on similar bills proposed by Congress.104 A
substantial number of the state statutes challenged in federal court contain
either nearly or precisely identical language as in the federal models.105 The
Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 187, 194-96 (6th Cir. 1997), and Carhart
v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142, 1149 (8th Cir. 1999).
102. See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 195 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452,
1458 (8th Cir. 1995)).
103. See, e.g., Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 14 F.3d 848, 863 n.21 (3rd
Cir. 1994); Causeway Med. Suite v. Foster, 43 F. Supp.2d 604, 611 (E.D. La. 1999) (“‘[U]ndue
burden’ standard applies only to previability abortions”); Planned Parenthood of Central N.J. v.
Verniero, 41 F. Supp.2d 478, 499 n.12 (D.N.J. 1998); Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 196 (6th Cir.
1997) (“We can see no reason to apply a different standard for pre- and post-viability abortion.
We conclude that Casey’s analysis should be extended to post-viability abortion regulations.”);
Richmond Med. Ctr. v. Gilmore, 55 F. Supp.2d 441, 478 (E.D. Va. 1999). In concluding that a
different test does not apply, the Gilmore court noted:
[W]hen the facial challenge is to a post-viability abortion measure. It is true that the
Casey ‘undue burden’ standard applies only to pre-viability abortion regulations, but the
analysis in Casey respecting the appropriate standard for facial challenges transcended the
line drawn . . . at viability for purposes of the substantive constitutional right.
Id.
104. See Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995, H.R. 1833, 104th Cong. (1995) (vetoed on
April 9, 1996) noting:
Any physician who . . . knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion and thereby kills a
human fetus shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . . This . . . shall not apply to a partialbirth abortion that is necessary to save the life of a mother whose life is endangered by a
physical disorder, illness, or injury . . . . [T]he term ‘partial-birth abortion’ means an
abortion in which the person performing the abortion partially vaginally delivers a living
fetus before killings the fetus and completing the delivery.
Id.; see also Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1997, H.R. 1122, 106th Cong. (1997) (vetoed on
October 10, 1997).
105. See Verniero, 41 F. Supp.2d at 495-96.
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majority of courts reviewing partial birth abortion legislation have found them
to be unconstitutional on several, interrelated grounds, where the legislation
contains vague and overbroad language, unduly burdens women’s access to
abortion, forces women to have less safe abortions, and fails to include a
health exception or includes an inadequate life exception.106
1.

Statutes Vague and/or Lack Scienter Provision

Ohio’s partial birth statute was the first to be challenged in federal court107
and was found to be unconstitutional for each of the above reasons. The Ohio
act created civil and criminal liability for doctors who performed a D&X
procedure (partial birth abortion) upon a pregnant woman (with a previable or
viable fetus)108 and for any abortion procedure performed on a viable fetus,
unless necessary to save the life or to prevent serious bodily impairment of the
woman.109 In Women’s Medical Professional Corporation v. Voinovich,110 the
Sixth Circuit enjoined enforcement of the act, finding the law
unconstitutionally vague in its description of the banned procedure such that
the law could be read to include procedures often performed on previable
fetuses.111 While the act specifically banned only the D&X procedure, the
court focused on the vague statutory description of the procedure.112 The Ohio
act described the procedure as “the termination of a human pregnancy by
purposely inserting a suction device into the skull of a fetus to remove the
brain” and specifically excluded from the definition the suction curettage and
suction aspiration procedures of abortion.113 Key to the court’s analysis was
the legislature’s failure to also exclude the D&E from the statutory definition
of the banned procedure.114 The court found that the D&E procedure, on
occasion, utilizes suction devices that would include D&E under the general
ban, absent an explicit exception.115 Because abortion doctors could not
accurately determine which procedures were banned, the act did not provide
fair warning and was, therefore, unconstitutionally vague.116
106. See generally Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 190.
107. Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142, 1148 (8th Cir. 1999); see also Voinovich, 130 F.3d
187 (6th Cir. 1997).
108. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.15(B) (Anderson 1998) (“No person shall knowingly
perform or attempt to perform a dilation and extraction procedure upon a pregnant woman.”).
The Act does not provide for criminal liability against the woman seeking the abortion.
Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 191.
109. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.17 (Anderson 1998).
110. 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997).
111. Id. at 200.
112. Id. at 198.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 200.
115. Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 199.
116. Id. at 197-99.
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Unlike the Ohio act, the Rhode Island act117 at issue in Rhode Island
Medical Society v. Whitehouse,118 did not specifically identify the medical
procedure to be banned.119 The district court noted that, if possible, the law
should be read by the court so as to find it constitutional and “must consider
limiting constructions offered by the state . . .[and] Attorney General.”120
Unable to find a reasonable, constitutional reading of the act, the court deemed
the act unconstitutionally vague.121 While the court noted that most abortion
procedures would not fall under the ban, the D&E procedure could be
construed so as to fall under the ban.122 The most problematic language was
the term “substantial portion,” that was not defined in the act.123 The court
determined that an arm or leg of a fetus could be deemed to be a “substantial
portion” of a “living fetus” such that the D&E procedure, that often results in
removal of the fetus in parts, would be considered a “partial birth abortion.”124
Because the “phrase is so vague as to be meaningless,”125 the act failed since
physicians could not determine what conduct would be considered illegal.126
Finding a similarly worded New Jersey statute127 to be vague, the district court
in Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey v. Verniero128 suggested that the
legislature could have avoided vagueness challenges by defining the banned
procedures with medical terminology.129
Relying on Colautti v. Franklin,130 many courts reviewing potentially
vague statutes have noted that a scienter requirement may alleviate a vagueness
problem.131

117. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.12 (1998). The act prohibits a person from “deliberately and
intentionally deliver[ing] into the vagina a living fetus, or a substantial person thereof, for the
purpose of performing a procedure the person performing the abortion knows will kill the infant,
and kills the infant.” R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.12-1(c) (1998) (emphasis added).
118. 66 F. Supp.2d 288 (D.R.I. 1999).
119. Whitehouse, 66 F. Supp.2d at 294.
120. Id. at 305.
121. Id. at 311.
122. Id. at 308-09.
123. Id. at 309-12.
124. Whitehouse, 66 F. Supp.2d at 310-12.
125. Id. at 311.
126. Id. at 312. Several other district courts have found similarly worded statutes void for
vagueness. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Central N.J. v. Verniero, 41 F. Supp.2d 478, 493-94
(D.N.J. 1998); Eubanks v. Stengel, 28 F. Supp.2d 1024, 1037-38 (W.D. Ky. 1998); Carhart v.
Stenberg, 11 F. Supp.2d 1099, 1131-32 (D. Neb. 1998).
127. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-6 (West 1997).
128. 41 F. Supp.2d 478 (D.N.J. 1998).
129. Verniero, 41 F. Supp.2d at 496 n.9 (“The Legislature need not use medical terminology
in order to ban certain medical procedures. However . . . definitions ascribed by the medical
community to terms used in the Act are certainly relevant to . . . [the] vagueness analysis.”).
130. 439 U.S. 379, 390-97 (1979).
131. See Verniero, 41 F. Supp.2d at 494.
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In Colautti, the Supreme Court found that a lack of a scienter requirement
compounded a statute’s vagueness and noted that such a requirement “may
avoid those consequences to the accused which may otherwise render a vague
or indefinite statute invalid.”132 The Verniero court, however, noted that “[a]
scienter requirement cannot eliminate vagueness . . . if it is satisfied by an
‘intent’ to do something that is in itself ambiguous.”133 Finding a scienter
requirement inadequate to cure an ambiguous statute, the court in Richmond
Medical Center For Women v. Gilmore134 recognized the limitations of a
statutory scienter requirement “as some sort of a cure-all or antidote”.135
Additionally, at least one court would require scienter in the abortion
context.136
2.

Undue Burden Imposed on Women Seeking Abortions

As the following cases will illustrate, courts have found partial birth
abortion acts to place an undue burden on women seeking abortions on
previable fetuses, particularly when the legislation fails to limit its scope to
viable fetuses.137 Additionally, some partial birth abortion bans limited to
viable fetuses have been found unconstitutional for failure to include adequate
exceptions for the life or health of the woman.138 An attempt to set forth a
standard by which to analyze the constitutionality of partial birth abortion bans
on previable fetuses is particularly difficult given that the lower federal courts
are not in agreement as to whether the Casey “undue burden” standard139 is
limited to pre-viability abortion regulations.140 Some courts have limited
Casey’s “undue burden” standard solely to pre-viability abortion procedures,141

132. Colautti, 439 U.S. at 395 n.13.
133. Verniero, 41 F. Supp.2d at 494-95 (quoting Nova Records, Inc. v. Sendak, 706 F.2d 782,
789 (7th Cir. 1983)).
134. 55 F. Supp.2d 441 (E.D. Va. 1999).
135. Id. at 498-99.
136. Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 205-06 (“In an area as controversial as abortion, the need for a
scienter requirement is, as the Supreme Court pointed out, particularly important . . . [The] lack of
scienter will have a profound chilling effect on the willingness of physicians to perform
abortions.”).
137. See Verniero, 41 F. Supp.2d at 503 (citing cases that have found partial birth abortion
bans to be unconstitutional for imposing an undue burden).
138. See id.
139. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
140. See supra text accompanying note 103. See also Gilmore, 55 F. Supp.2d at 478 (“It is
true that the Casey ‘undue burden’ standard applies only to pre-viability abortion regulations, but
the analysis in Casey respecting the appropriate standard for facial challenges transcended the line
drawn . . . at viability . . . . The Supreme Court purported to set forth a standard for general
applicability.”).
141. See Gilmore, 55 F. Supp.2d at 478 (the “‘undue burden standard’ applies only to previability abortion regulations.”).
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while others have extended the “undue burden” standard to also include postviability abortion regulations.142
The Eighth Circuit initially addressed the constitutionality of partial birth
abortion laws on September 14, 1999, when it filed joint opinions on such laws
in Nebraska, Iowa, and Arkansas.143 In Carhart v. Stenberg,144 the Eighth
Circuit found a Nebraska partial birth abortion act unconstitutional on undue
burden grounds using the Casey standard.145 It specifically noted that the
decision was based solely on the undue burden created by the ban of the D&E
procedure on previable fetuses and did not analyze the strength or weakness of
other challenges.146 The Nebraska law referred to and attempted to outlaw
“partial birth abortion” defined in the act as a procedure in which an unborn
child or “substantial portion thereof” is “partially delivered.”147 While the
legislature only intended to ban the D&X procedure, the district court found
that the definition of the “partial birth abortion” was broad enough to
reasonably include the most common method of second trimester abortions, the
D&E procedure.148 The Eighth Circuit found that by banning both the D&X
and the D&E procedures, the act “would clearly have the effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking a pre-viability abortion”
because it would prohibit the most common procedure for second trimester
abortions.149
In Voinovich, the Sixth Circuit also struck down a partial birth abortion ban
based on undue burden grounds.150 Like the Eighth Circuit, the Voinovich
court determined that the act incorporated both the D&X and the D&E
procedures.151 The court relied heavily on Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth152 in reviewing the Ohio partial birth abortion act. While

142. See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 196 (“We conclude that Casey’s analysis should be extended
to post-viability abortion regulations.”).
143. See Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1999); Planned Parenthood of Greater
Iowa, Inc. v. Miller, 195 F.3d 386 (8th Cir. 1999); Little Rock Family Planning Servs. v. Jegley,
192 F.3d 794 (8th Cir. 1999).
144. 192 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1999).
145. Id. at 1148 n.10 (noting that the case did not raise any questions with respect to
procedures performed on viable fetuses).
146. Id. at 1146 n.4.
147. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-326(9) (1998).
148. Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp.2d 1099, 1127-31 (D. Neb. 1998) (emphasizing the
ambiguity of the term “substantial portion”); Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142, 1145 (8th Cir.
1999).
149. Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1151.
150. Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 203.
151. Id. at 201.
152. 428 U.S. 52, 75-79 (1976) (finding ban on saline amniocentesis method of abortion after
the first twelve weeks of pregnancy unconstitutional because it would inhibit the vast majority of
abortions and would restrict a woman’s choice to a more dangerous abortion method).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2000]

WILL CHARLIE BROWN FINALLY KICK THE FOOTBALL?

1101

Danforth was decided using the Roe trimester framework rather than the Casey
undue burden standard, the court reasoned that although “Roe’s second
trimester standard allowed for fewer constitutional abortion regulations than
does Casey’s undue burden standard, it follows that a statute that bans a
common abortion procedure would constitute an undue burden.”153 Because
the act was not restricted to abortions performed on viable fetuses, it was found
to be an unconstitutional burden on woman’s right to choose an abortion.154
Other federal district courts finding partial birth abortion bans
unconstitutional on undue burden grounds have, likewise, emphasized the
problems created by bans that incorporate the D&E procedure.155 In Richmond
Medical Center v. Gilmore,156 the district court held that because the Virginia
statute 157 excluded the most common and preferred second trimester abortion
procedure (D&E) and left a statistically more risky procedure in its place
(induction), it resulted in an undue burden.158 In addition to restricting safe
abortion procedures, the court in Rhode Island Medical Society v. Whitehouse
further found that the state ban imposed an undue burden on women by forcing
them to cross state lines in order to get an abortion.159 The Verniero court also
found that the New Jersey act160 “chills physicians from performing most
conventional abortion procedures and thereby imposes an undue burden on a
woman’s constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy.”161
Maternal health exceptions are an additional source of controversy with
respect to partial birth abortion bans. The two main disputes involve the
following issues: 1) whether such an exception must be included in partial
birth abortion bans limited to viable fetuses and 2) whether “health” must
include both physical and mental health.162 The vast majority of federal courts
have found partial birth abortion bans that lack a “health” exception to be
unconstitutional, even if a “life” exception is included.163 These courts rely on
Casey’s holding that “subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest
in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even
proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary . . . for the preservation of the
153. Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 201.
154. See id.
155. See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 55 F. Supp.2d 441, 467-71 (E.D. Va.
1999); Rhode Island Med. Soc’y v. Whitehouse, 66 F. Supp.2d 288, 309 (D.R.I. 1999).
156. 55 F. Supp.2d 441 (E.D. Va. 1999).
157. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-74.2 (Michie 1998).
158. Gilmore, 55 F. Supp.2d at 483-85. The court noted that the D&E procedure accounts for
86%, while induction accounts for only 8.8% of second trimester abortion. Additionally,
maternal mortality rates are higher for labor induction than for D&E procedures. Id. at 483-84.
159. Whitehouse, 66 F. Supp.2d at 313.
160. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-6 (West 1997).
161. Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Verniero, 41 F. Supp.2d 478, 499 (D.N.J. 1998).
162. See, e.g., Verniero, 41 F. Supp.2d at 502; Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 203-10.
163. See Gilmore, 55 F. Supp.2d at 492; Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 209.
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life or health of the mother.”164 An abortion regulation, therefore, must protect
the life and health of the mother at all stages of pregnancy.165 Some states
have argued that a D&X procedure on viable fetuses is never medically
necessary to protect the health of the mother and, therefore, a “health”
exception is not required.166 Most courts, however, have declined to accept
such arguments due to conflicting evidence on the D&X procedure.167
The Voinovich court addressed the “medical necessity exception” in the
Ohio partial birth abortion ban, which excepted abortions necessary to save the
woman’s life or to avoid “a serious risk of the substantial and irreversible
impairment of a major bodily function.”168 The Sixth Circuit found such a
health exception, limited to physical health risks, to be unconstitutional for
failing to provide a mental health exception.169 The court looked to prior
Supreme Court cases to construe the meaning of “health.”170 In Doe v.
Bolton,171 decided the same day as Roe v. Wade,172 the Court approved a
district court’s construction of “medically necessary” abortion.173 The Court
agreed that a physician’s medical judgment “may be exercised in the light of
all factors – physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age
– relevant to the well-being of the patient. All of these factors may relate to
health.”174 Relying on this language, the Sixth Circuit concluded, “a woman
has the right to obtain a post-viability abortion if carrying a fetus to term would
cause severe non-temporary mental and emotional harm.”175 An adequate
health exception, therefore, should include abortions necessary to protect the
physical health and to prevent “severe irreversible risks of mental and
emotional harm.”176

164. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973))
(emphasis added).
165. Gilmore, 55 F. Supp.2d at 487.
166. Id. at 490-91 (insisting that the D&X procedure is not taught in medical schools or tested
in peer review journals).
167. Id. at 490-92.
168. Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 206 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §. 2919.17(A)(1) (Anderson
1997)).
169. Id. at 206-10.
170. Id. at 208-09.
171. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
172. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
173. Doe, 410 U.S. at 192.
174. Id.
175. Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 209.
176. Id.
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C. The Seventh Circuit has Upheld Partial Birth Abortion Legislation in Both
Wisconsin and Illinois
In 1998, a federal district court in Wisconsin denied Planned Parenthood a
preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Wisconsin partial birth
abortion ban.177 The Seventh Circuit ordered a preliminary injunction after
determining that the plaintiffs may have succeeded in proving the law
unconstitutional on either of three separate grounds: 1) failure to include an
exception for fetuses not viable at the time of the procedure, 2) failure to
include an exception for the health of the mother, and 3) vagueness.178 The
circuit court stated that its opinion was based on a limited record and that a
“full trial may cast the facts in a different light.”179
Indeed, the court’s prediction was accurate. After a full trial, the district
court held that the statute was constitutional.180 Finding the circuit court’s
concerns ultimately unfounded, the district court determined that the statute
was not vague and did not require exceptions for previability abortions or the
health of the mother.181 The plaintiffs in Planned Parenthood v. Doyle
challenged the act’s validity on grounds identical to those made against other
state partial birth abortion laws; however, the court rejected every
constitutional challenge to the Wisconsin statute.182
The district court determined that the term “partial birth abortion” was
commonly known to include only the D&X procedure and did not include any
common second trimester abortion procedures.183 Additionally the court found
that only in the D&X procedure does the doctor “intend” to kill an “intact
child.” Opponents of the bill, according to the court, strained the meaning of
“child” to include “dismembered body parts” in order to argue that the ban
encompassed the D&E procedure that frequently results in the destruction of
an intact fetus.184
Secondly, the district court found that a previability exception was not
required because the act serves to further “several compelling state interests,
177. Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Doyle, 9 F. Supp.2d 1033 (W.D. Wis. 1998).
Wisconsin’s statute bans any person from performing a partial birth abortion. WIS. STAT. §
940.16(2) (1997). It defines “partial birth abortion” as “an abortion in which a person partially
vaginally delivers a living child, causes the death of the partially delivered child with the intent to
kill the child, and then completes the delivery of the child.” Id. § 940.16(1)(b). The Act allows
for an exception for abortions “necessary to save the life of woman whose life is endangered by a
physical illness.” Id. § 940.16(3).
178. Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Doyle, 162 F.3d. 463, 466-69 (7th Cir. 1998).
179. Id. at 466.
180. Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Doyle, 44 F. Supp.2d 975, 983 (W.D. Wis. 1999).
181. See id. at 983-94.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 984-85.
184. Id.
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including interests in maternal health, potential life and morality.”185 Lastly,
the act need not include an exception for cases in which the D&X procedure is
necessary to protect the mother’s health, because based on testimony at trial,
the court determined that partial birth abortion “is never medically necessary to
preserve the health or save the life of the woman and abolition of the procedure
does not subject women to materially greater health risks.”186 Furthermore, the
act does not impose an undue burden on a woman’s right to an abortion
because women are left with safe, alternative methods of abortion.187
Another district court reviewed a similar partial birth abortion law in
Illinois and found it to be unconstitutional. Acting without an evidentiary
hearing, the court held the Illinois ban188 unconstitutional in Hope Clinic v.
Ryan189 and granted a permanent injunction.190 The court first found the act’s
language subject to multiple interpretations, primarily because key terms were
not defined in the statute, and determined the act was void for vagueness.191
The court stated that when confronted with potential infringements of
constitutionally protected rights and with criminal penalties, it requires a
statute to pass a higher standard of certainty.192 The court next found that the
act imposed an undue burden on a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy
prior to viability because the vague language of the act could potentially ban
safe, early abortion procedures.193 Lastly, the ban on partial birth abortions on
viable fetuses was also improper in that it failed to include an exception for
procedures necessary to protect the woman’s physical or mental health.194
Following the contradictory district court decisions on similar partial birth
abortion laws, the Seventh Circuit consolidated the appeals and heard the cases
en banc.195 Relying heavily on the recent Supreme Court case Chicago v.
Morales,196 the court determined that the state courts were the proper courts to
interpret the statute, rather than the federal courts and that both laws could be

185. Doyle, 44 F. Supp.2d at 983.
186. Id. at 984.
187. Id.
188. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 513/10 (West 1998). The act bans a “partial birth abortion,”
defined as “an abortion in which the person performing the abortion partially vaginally delivers a
living human fetus or infant before killing the fetus or infant and completing delivery.” Id.
§ 513/5.
189. 995 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
190. Id. at 849.
191. Id. at 855. The court focused on the statutory definition of “partial birth abortion” as “an
abortion in which the person performing the abortion partially vaginally delivers a living human
fetus . . . before killing [it].” Id. at 850.
192. Id. at 856.
193. Id. at 857.
194. Hope Clinic, 995 F. Supp. at 857.
195. Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999).
196. 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
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applied in a constitutional manner.197 Until the state courts had an opportunity
to review the statutes, however, the Seventh Circuit issued “precautionary
injunctions” to temporarily limit the statutes’ application.198 The court
addressed each of the plaintiffs’ challenges to the constitutionality of the
statutes and found them each unfounded.199
1.

Not Vague

The court began by recognizing that while the statutory definition of
“partial birth abortion” does not track the medical definition of the D&X
procedure and while the general public may be confused, physicians recognize
that the statute only applies to the D&X procedure.200 Further, having been
assured by the Attorneys General of Illinois and Wisconsin that their states’
respective statutes dealt only with the D&X procedure, the court determined
that the vagueness concerns could be resolved.201 While the plaintiffs’ charged
the district court with “revisionism,” the court reasoned that “[u]sing a medical
definition to supplement a vague lay definition does not strike us as
revisionism or an exercise in deconstruction.”202 The court criticized other
circuits that had declared abortion statutes unconstitutionally vague,
irrespective of “how precise an interpretation state courts eventually
develop.”203 It stated, “[o]nly if vagueness remains after judicial interpretation
is there a constitutional problem.”204
The court supported its conclusion that doctors clearly understand that only
the D&X procedure is to be banned by looking to states where partial birth

197. Ryan, 195 F.3d at 864 (“[S]tate courts are entitled to construe state laws to reduce their
ambiguity, and that federal courts should evaluate state laws as they have been construed, not just
as they appear in the statute books.”) (relying on Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999)).
Compare Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 861 (insisting that state courts are the appropriate bodies to
smooth “interpretive wrinkles” and that courts should avoid “advisory opinions”), with Hope
Clinic, 195 F.3d at 877 (Posner, C.J., dissenting) (“No case holds . . . that until the statute is
construed by the state courts, a claim that it is unconstitutionally vague is premature. No case
denies the authority of the federal courts to interpret state statutes, which is something we do all
the time.”).
198. Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 876.
199. Id. at 871-76.
200. Id. at 864. The court further commented that the legislature may have been fearful that a
statutory medical description could prove the statute meaningless if physicians need only to
slightly alter the procedure defined so as to remove the act from the statutory ban. Id. at 863.
201. Id. at 865.
202. Id.; but cf. Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 878 (Posner, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the
majority’s decision is internally inconsistent because the court both rejects the charge that the
statute is vague, yet by issuing “precautionary injunctions” until the state courts can clarify the
statutory language, the court impliedly suggests that the statutes are unconstitutionally vague).
203. Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 866.
204. Id.
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abortion laws are currently in effect.205 The court predicted two ways in which
vague statutes could affect physicians and abortion rates in such states: 1) the
percentage of all second trimester abortions would decrease if physicians sent
patients to states without partial birth abortion regulations, or 2) the ratio of
D&X and D&E procedures compared to other abortion procedures would
decrease if doctors feared prosecution.206 Relying on statistics from Indiana,207
the court concluded that Indiana’s partial birth abortion had no effect on late
term abortions.208
2.

No Undue Burden and No Health Exception Required

Having interpreted the scope of the ban to be limited to the D&X
procedure, the court determined whether the statutes created an undue burden
on abortion by failing to include an exception for the woman’s health.209 The
district court had found that the D&X procedure was never medically
necessary to maintain a woman’s health and may even be hazardous to her
health.210 Relying on the district court’s findings, while recognizing that other
courts had reached different conclusions,211 the circuit court determined that

205. Id. at 870.
206. Id.
207. Id. Indiana was the only state in the Seventh Circuit with such a statute currently in
effect and its terms are virtually identical to Illinois’ statute. Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 862.
208. Id. at 870-71.
During 1997 a total of 13,208 abortions were performed in Indiana. During the . . . 6
months [prior to the law’s enactment] 74 late-second-trimester abortions were performed:
72 by D&E . . . . During the second six months (that is, after the partial-birth-abortion
law took effect), 87 late-second-trimester abortions were performed, all by D&E. . . .
Abortion by D&E during the first six months represented 1.03% of all abortions
performed in Indiana . . . . Abortion by D&E during the second six months represented
1.39% of all abortions in the state.
Id.
209. Id. at 871. The court acknowledged that had they found the statutes to include the D&E
procedure, as did the Eighth Circuit, then the laws would impose an undue burden. Id.
210. Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 871-72 (citing Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Doyle, 44 F.
Supp.2d 975, 979-82 (W.D. Wis. 1999).
None of the physicians would state unequivocally that the D&X procedure is safer than
the D&E procedure. . . .[One doctor] admitted that he had never encountered a situation
where D&X would have been the best procedure to use. [Dr.] Haskell, who invented the
procedure, admitted that the D&X procedure is never medically necessary to save the life
or to preserve the health of a woman.
Id. (emphasis added); Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 872 (“We proceed on the assumption, which
appears to be shared by the American Medical Association, that the D&X is not the best or safest
option in any articulable category of situations.”).
211. Id. at 872.
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Casey did not require a “health exception” from a ban on an abortion
procedure that “lacks demonstrable health benefits.”212
As to the meaning of “undue burden” for purposes of analysis, the Seventh
Circuit deemed that the key word is “undue” rather than “burden.”213
“‘[U]ndue’ means not only ‘substantial’ but also that the burden must be undue
in relation to the woman’s interests, rather than undue in relation to the court’s
assessment of society’s interests.”214 Rejecting the plaintiffs’ theory that every
regulation of a medical procedure is undue (because many regulations create
small burdens), the court determined that the prohibition of the D&X
procedure does not create an undue burden for woman seeking an abortion
because they will continue to have safe, alternative procedures from which to
choose.215 The court stated, “when state law offers many safe options to that
end, the regulation of an additional option does not produce an undue
burden.”216
“The question in the end . . . is whether the state legislatures exceeded their
constitutional powers. . . . Only if every regulation related to abortion must
contain a case-by-case ‘health exception’ is there a problem with these laws.
Yet Casey did not say that health effects must be evaluated case-by-case, rather
than procedure-by-procedure.”217 The court suggested that the regulations
would be more problematic if they required a case-by-case evaluation of the
health effects of a given procedure.218 According to the court, Casey did not
require states to evaluate health effects on a case-by-case basis, rather than
evaluated procedure-by-procedure prior to enacting a law. 219 To require such a
standard would effectively render the statutes meaningless, since a physician
presumably will only perform a procedure he deems to be “medically
necessary, and would amount to a rule that no state may regulate any abortion
procedure.”220

212. Id. at 871 (“The point that the plurality [in Casey] made was that a statute that lacks a
‘health exception’ may unduly burden the woman’s right to obtain an abortion before the fetus
has reached viability.”).
213. Id. at 874.
214. Id. (noting that a small cost or inconvenience is not “undue”).
215. Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 874.
216. Id. at 871.
217. Id. at 872-73.
218. Id. at 873.
219. Id.
220. Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 873 (relying particularly on Mazurek v. Armstrong that holds
that states may limit performance of abortions to physicians and may permit laws that regulate by
class of procedures or regulate by class of medical providers).
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V. MISSOURI’S INFANT’S PROTECTION ACT
A.

Key Aspects of the Law
1.

Crime of Infanticide

Missouri’s “Infant’s Protection Act” creates the class A felony of
infanticide and is codified in the criminal code under “offenses against the
person.”221 A person commits the crime of infanticide if “such person causes
the death of a living infant with the purpose to cause said death by an overt act
performed when the infant is partially born or born.”222
2.

“Partially Born” Defined in Statute

As defined in the statute, “partially born” refers to the “partial separation
of a child from the mother with the child’s head intact with the torso.”223 A
child is partially separated when the head is outside the mother’s external
cervical, when presented in a cephalic presentation, when any part of the torso
above the navel is outside the mother’s external cervical, or when in a breech
position.224 In layman’s terms, if the “child” is removed headfirst, then the
child is partially separated once the head enters the vagina so long as the head
is intact with the torso. If the child is removed feet first (as is most often the
case in the D&X procedure), then the child is partially separated once the
upper portion of the body has entered the vagina so long as the head is intact
with the torso.
3.

Act Protects Crimes against “Living Infants”

The “living infant” protected by the statute is one who has been 1) born or
partially born, 2) medically determined to be alive, 3) not deemed to be “dead”
pursuant to medical standards and the statutory definition,225 and 4) not yet
attained the age of thirty days post birth.226 Because the Act is intended to
protect “living infants,” no reference is made to “fetuses” or “viability.” The
legislative history reveals that the Committee on Public Health and Welfare’s

221. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.300 (1999).
222. Id. § 565.300.3 (emphasis added).
223. Id. § 565.300.2 (3) (emphasis added).
224. Id.
225. MO. REV. STAT. § 194.005 (1996). The statute sets forth the legal definition of “death”
as “determined in accordance with the usual and customary standards of medical practice,
provided that death shall not be determined to have occurred unless the following minimal
conditions have been met: (1) . . . irreversible cessation of spontaneous respiration and
circulation . . . .” Id.
226. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.300.2 (2) (1999).
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original version of the bill had been intended to amend the abortion statutes so
as to ban a “partial birth abortion” on a viable fetus.227
4.

Scienter Requirement

In order to be held criminally liable under the Act, a person must perform
the “overt act” necessary to commit the crime. The language of the statute
also specifies that the person must perform such an “overt act” “with the
purpose” of committing the crime. A mother or any other person may also be
liable if that person firmly intends to commit infanticide and takes a
“substantial step” towards committing such crime.228
5.

No Criminal Liability for Procedures Used to Save the Life of the
Mother or Child

The Act protects physicians who use usual and customary medical
procedures to either save the life of the mother during pregnancy or birth or to
save the life of any unborn or partially born child of the same pregnancy from
being found criminally responsible. Furthermore, no mother shall be held
criminally responsible if the physician is not found to be criminally
responsible.229
6.

Statute Excludes Legal Abortion Procedures from its Scope

Legal abortion procedures do not fall under this Act so long as “[1)] the act
that causes the death is [2)] performed prior to the child being partially born,
[3)]even though the death of the child occurs as a result of the abortion after
the child is partially born.”230 While this definition could certainly be more
precise with respect to which abortion techniques are considered to be “legal,”
several reasonable interpretations are permissible.
B.

Other Related Missouri Abortion Laws Currently in Force

Missouri has long been considered to be an “active battleground[] and
testing ground[] for abortion regulation.”231
Missouri’s legislature is
considered to be one of the most hostile legislatures in the country toward the
Supreme Court’s landmark abortion decision in Roe v. Wade.232 In fact, the
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

H.B. 427, 90th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1999).
MO. REV. STAT. § 565.300.7 (1999).
Id. § 565.300.5.
Id. § 565.300.6 (emphasis added); see also infra text accompanying notes 249-62.
MATTHEW E. WETSTEIN, ABORTION RATES IN THE UNITED STATES: THE INFLUENCE OF
OPINION AND POLICY 95 (1996).
232. BARBARA HINKSON CRAIG & DAVID M. O’BRIEN, ABORTION AND AMERICAN POLITICS
83 (1993). A study of state abortion policy identified twenty-four different forms of abortion
policies codified into state law. WETSTEIN, supra note 231, at 95. Missouri, with eighteen
restrictions, was found to be the most restrictive state with respect to the number of abortion
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Supreme Court reviewed four challenges to Missouri abortion laws within
fifteen years of Roe.233 Missouri won a significant constitutional victory in
1989 when the Court upheld a comprehensive abortion regulation and signaled
a potential future retreat from the strict standard set forth in Roe.234
Currently in Missouri, a physician must test all fetuses beyond twenty
weeks gestational age for viability before performing an abortion.235 If a fetus
is viable, it may only be aborted to save the life or health of the mother.236 In
such cases, a second physician, who shall provide immediate medical care for
the aborted child, must be in attendance.237 Anyone who kills a child aborted
alive may be prosecuted for murder in the second degree.238
C. Will Missouri’s Infant’s Protection Act Survive Constitutional Scrutiny
Under Abortion Jurisprudence?
1.

Void for Vagueness?

Both the Sixth and Seventh circuits agree that a statute will be deemed
impermissibly vague if it fails to give reasonable notice of what conduct is
forbidden.239 The Seventh Circuit, relying on Chicago v. Morales,240 would

regulations. Id. The study also found that those states with the fewest abortion restrictions (New
York and California) also had some of the highest abortion rates in the nation. Id. at 94-95. The
suggestion, however, that the number of abortion restrictions in a state is directly correlated with
the number of abortions performed could be deceiving. For example, by comparing the number
of abortion restrictions in a state with the actual number of abortions performed in a state (as
reported by state health agencies) we find that a total of 70,389 abortions were performed in the
most restrictive states (Missouri, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania) while only 36,839 abortions
were performed in the least restrictive states (Connecticut, Oregon, and Vermont). Compare id.,
with Lisa M. Koonin et al., Abortion Surveillance, United States, 1988, in ABORTION, MEDICINE,
AND THE LAW 458, 465-66 (J. Douglas Butler & David F. Walbert eds., 1992). The most recent
data available from the Missouri Department of Health shows that 12,751 abortions were
performed in Missouri in 1998. Table 12, supra note 39.
233. See Danforth v. Rodgers, 414 U.S. 1035 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S.
476 (1983); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
234. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 499.
235. See MO. REV. STAT. § 188.029 (1986). Missouri is one of four states (Alabama,
Louisiana, Missouri, and Ohio) with laws requiring a physician to perform tests to determine
viability. THE NARAL FOUNDATION, A STATE-BY-STATE REVIEW OF ABORTION AND
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS xiii (1998).
236. See MO. REV. STAT § 188.030.1 (1979). Missouri is one of forty-one states that prohibit
abortion after viability under specified circumstances. THE NARAL FOUNDATION, supra note
235, at xii.
237. See MO. REV. STAT. § 188.030.3 (1979).
238. See id. § 188.035.
239. See supra Parts IV.B.1, IV.C.1.
240. 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
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not declare a statute vague prior to judicial interpretation by a state court.241 In
Voinovich, the Sixth Circuit interpreted a statute to be vague;242 however, it is
not clear whether the Sixth Circuit would impose a similar restriction on
federal interpretation following Morales. A statute must be interpreted in a
light most favorable to finding it as constitutional and a court must apply any
reasonable construction so as to find it constitutional.243 A court should
narrowly construe a statute if reasonable.244
Upon close reading, the Infant’s Protection Act outlaws only those 1) overt
acts performed with the purpose to kill245 2) a partially born infant that is
deemed to be alive and not dead according to medical standards.246 The “overt
act” must be 3) “performed when the infant is partially born or born.”247 A
“living infant” is “partially born” only if 4) the child’s head is intact with the
torso, and either the child’s head is outside the uterus, or the lower half of the
child’s body below the navel is outside the uterus.248 Additionally, the Act
does not include “legal abortions” within the prohibition.249 A legal abortion is
any overt act intended to cause the death, performed prior to partial birth,250
even if the fetus is “alive” when aborted and does not die until after removed
from the uterus.251
The relevant question becomes: Are the statutory definitions sufficiently
clear so as to apprise doctors of the prohibited conduct? The Act could surely
have defined prohibited conduct more simply by referring to the specific
medical procedures to be outlawed. While the definitions are complicated, if
comprehensible and reasonably capable of being found to be constitutional,
they should be so construed.
Based upon the AMA accepted definition of the D&X procedure,252 the
procedure would clearly be banned under the Act. The important distinction
between the D&X procedure and traditional abortion procedures is that the

241. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 861.
242. Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 200.
243. Whitehouse, 66 F. Supp.2d at 305-06 (relying on DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
244. Id.
245. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.300.3 (1999).
246. See id. § 565.300.2 (2).
247. See id. § 565.300.3.
248. See id. § 565.300.2(3).
249. See id. § 565.300.6.
250. As outlined earlier in the text, “partial birth” requires that the fetus’ head be intact with
the torso, and either the head be outside the uterus or the lower half of the body be outside the
uterus. Therefore, should the head detach from the torso or should the “overt act” be performed
while the fetus is in the uterus or before the head or lower half of the body leaves the uterus, then
the “overt act” is a legal abortion and is protected. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.300.2 (3) (1999).
251. See id. § 565.300.6.
252. See Late-Term Pregnancy Termination Techniques, supra note 24.
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fatal step is not performed until the body of the intact fetus is removed from
the uterus.253 Only after removing the torso of the fetus from the uterus does
the physician puncture the skull and evacuate the cranial contents.254
Physicians who perform the D&X procedure would certainly fall under the ban
because they 1) intend to partially remove an intact fetus from the uterus, 2)
intend to remove the torso of the fetus from the uterus, and 3) only after
removing the torso from the uterus do they then perform the fatal act of
puncturing the skull.255 The D&X procedure would not fall under the “legal
abortion” exception, because at no time does a doctor deliver the “act”
intended to kill the fetus prior to partially removing the fetus from the
uterus.256
The common first trimester abortion procedure of suction curettage or
vacuum aspiration would fall under the “legal abortion” exception, and,
therefore, would not be banned. This procedure entails inserting a suction tube
into the uterus and removing the fetus with suction.257 During suction
curettage abortions, the fetus normally dies prior to removal from the uterus,
because the fetus is not developed enough to withstand the pressure of suction.
The fetus, therefore, is typically dismembered and dies from the suction
performed within the uterus.
Induction abortions are most commonly performed late in the second or
third trimester of pregnancy. The physician inserts a solution of saline, urea,
or prostaglandin into the amniotic cavity in order to “cause fetal demise”
within the uterus.258 Regardless of whether the fetus dies within the uterus or
after expulsion, a physician will not be held liable under the Act because the
injection that causes the death is performed while the fetus is in the uterus.
Lastly, the D&E procedure should not be prohibited under the Act. A
physician performs the D&E by reaching into the uterus and removing the
fetus in parts using a combination of suction and traction.259 While a rare
occurrence, at times a physician will deliver a fetus intact. This is an
unintended consequence and not the standard procedure for the D&E.260 The
fetus is generally so fragile when the D&E is performed that it cannot
withstand the suction and traction.261 The D&E procedure should be excluded
from the Act for either of two reasons. First, the D&E should fall within the

253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Compare Late-Term Pregnancy Termination Techniques, supra note 24, with MO. REV.
STAT. § 565.300.6 (1999).
257. See Doyle, 9 F. Supp.2d at 1036; Gilmore, 55 F. Supp.2d at 451-52.
258. See generally Gilmore, 55 F. Supp.2d at 456-57.
259. See Whitehouse, 66 F. Supp.2d at 296.
260. Id.
261. Id.
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“legal abortion” exception because the doctor uses suction and traction with
the intent to remove the fetus in pieces. The traction and suction are performed
while the fetus remains in the uterus, and are ultimately responsible for the
fetus’ demise. Secondly, should the doctor deliver an intact fetus, he will not
satisfy the “intent” requirement to cause the death of the fetus “by an overt act
performed when the infant is partially born or born.”262 Delivery of an intact
fetus would be an unintended consequence.
While the statutory definitions in Missouri’s Infant’s Protection Act are
complicated, they are not constitutionally vague and can reasonably be read to
ban only the D&X procedure. While some may suggest that the D&E
procedure also falls within the Act’s ban, proper statutory construction would
require the judiciary to narrowly construe the Act in the light most favorable to
finding it constitutional.263
2.

Does the Regulation Constitute an Undue Burden on Women Seeking
Abortion of Previable Fetus?

The language of Missouri’s Infant’s Protection Act does not explicitly
limit the scope of the Act to protect only viable fetuses.264 While the
legislative history shows that an earlier version of the bill (intended to modify
the abortion statutes rather than the criminal laws) was meant to protect only
viable fetuses, later versions of the bill dropped the viability language and
replaced it with the term “living infant.”265 “Living infant” could be
interpreted to be limited solely to viable fetuses or could be interpreted to
cover “living” previable fetuses. The Act does give the doctor discretion in
determining whether the fetus is “living,”266 so in order to encourage a finding
of constitutionality, a court could limit the interpretation of “living infant” to
only “viable fetuses.” If the Act protects only viable fetuses, then it will not
place any undue burden on women seeking to abort a previable fetus. The
courts should narrowly construe the Act to its constitutional applications so as
to uphold the statute and to prevent any undue burden on women.267
Even if “living infant” were not read to mean “viable fetus” the statute
could also withstand a constitutional inquiry, given that it should only be read
to prohibit a D&X abortion. A ban limited to the D&X procedure should not
create an undue burden on women seeking abortions prior to fetal viability
because those women and their doctors would continue to have access to the
most common forms of abortion techniques.

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

MO. REV. STAT. § 565.300.3 (1999) (emphasis added).
Whitehouse, 66 F. Supp.2d at 305-06.
See MO. REV. STAT. § 565.300.2 (2) (1999).
H.B. 427, 90th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1999).
MO. REV. STAT. § 565.300.2 (2) (1999).
See supra text accompanying note 243.
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With access to the most common and safe abortion procedures, women
cannot claim that the state has placed a substantial obstacle in their path to
aborting a previable fetus.
3.

Does the Regulation Constitute Undue Burden for Failure to Include
Exceptions for Life and Health of the Mother?

The Infant’s Protection Act contains an absolute exclusion for medical acts
performed to save the life of the mother.268 Any constitutional problems
remaining for the Act revolve around the necessity to include an exception for
the health of the mother. Casey clearly held that “subsequent to viability, the
State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it
chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where necessary, in
appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother.”269 While it will continue to be debated as to whether a statutory
health exception must encompass both physical and mental health,270
Missouri’s Infant’s Protection Act fails to include any exception for health.
Hope Clinic v. Ryan271 determined that a health exception is not necessary for
a ban on D&X abortions because the D&X procedure is never necessary to
protect the health of a woman; however, that factual determination has been
disputed in the vast majority of reported cases.272 A reasonable reading of
Casey reveals that some form of a health exception is required, even for
abortions of viable fetuses. Missouri’s Act, therefore, will fail a constitutional
undue burden analysis.
D. Does Drafting a Statute Framed as Infanticide Remove it From
Constitutional Requirements Imposed by Abortion Jurisprudence?
In more recent partial birth abortion lawsuits, defendants have begun to
argue that the proscribed procedure is an infanticide issue and not an abortion
issue “because once the living fetus is brought into the birth canal, the birth
process has begun.”273 They argue, “the constitutionality of the Act is not to
be measured against the decisions of the Supreme Court . . . which define the
constitutional parameters of state abortion laws.”274 These arguments have not
yet been successful, in part due to the fact that legislatures had enacted the
statutes as part of state codes regulating abortion, rather than criminal

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

MO. REV. STAT. § 565.300.5 (1999).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 879.
See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 206-10; Gilmore, 55 F. Supp.2d at 488-90.
Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 871.
See, e.g., Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 210; Gilmore, 55 F. Supp.2d at 490-91.
Causeway Med. Suite v. Foster, 43 F. Supp.2d 604, 609 (E.D. La. 1999).
Gilmore, 55 F. Supp.2d at 444.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2000]

WILL CHARLIE BROWN FINALLY KICK THE FOOTBALL?

1115

homicide.275 In those cases, it was difficult for states to argue that the purpose
of the laws was to combat infanticide when the acts actually regulated abortion
procedures. Missouri will attempt to use similar arguments to uphold the
Infant’s Protection Act that was included in the criminal homicide code rather
than the code regulating abortion.
Apart from the limited rights afforded to the fetus in constitutional abortion
law, in the years following Roe v. Wade, many state courts and legislatures
have become increasingly protective of fetal rights in tort, criminal, and
property law.276 The trend has been for states to expand the legal rights of a
fetus and to recognize that a fetus can be an independent victim under criminal
and tort law.277 In expanding the legal rights of the fetus in other areas of the
law, a tension necessarily grows between fetal rights and a woman’s right to
privacy. This tension becomes particularly acute when analyzing Missouri’s
Infant’s Protection Act.
1.

Fetal Rights under Missouri Law

a.

Compensation for Prenatal Injuries under Tort Law

Beginning in 1953 some remedies were made available for injuries
sustained by a fetus while in utero. Steggall v. Morris278 held that a parent of a
child born alive and who thereafter died from prenatal injuries could recover
under the wrongful death statute.279 Until 1983, Missouri did not allow tort
recovery for the death of a viable, but unborn fetus.280 Missouri first
recognized a cause of action for wrongful death of an unborn fetus in O’Grady
v. Brown.281 Finding that the legislature intended to establish a remedy for the

275. Id. at 480 n.44. The court ultimately declines to “circumvent the requirements of Roe
and Casey . . . [which] established the line of demarcation . . . in terms of whether the fetus was
viable or nonviable, not in terms of whether a fetus was in the process of being born.” Id. at 480.
276. See generally Alan S. Wasserstrom, J.D., Annotation, Homicide Based on Killing of
Unborn Child, 64 A.L.R. 5th 671 (1998).
277. Id.
278. 258 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. 1953) (en banc).
279. See id. at 581.
280. See Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336, 340 (Mo. 1976) (en banc).
281. 654 S.W.2d 904, 909 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (noting that fetal interests are protected in
other areas of the law, including criminal, abortion, child neglect, and property law). The court
distinguished between seemingly inconsistent approaches to fetal rights in the abortion and tort
law context. Id. at 910.
Roe v. Wade, while holding that the fetus is not a ‘person’ for purposes of the 14th
amendment, does not mandate the conclusion that the fetus is a legal nonentity. ‘The
abortion issue involves the resolution of the mother’s rights as against the child when the
two are in conflict. Whatever may be the determination of the rights in that context, this
special relation gives a third-party tortfeasor no comparable rights.’
Id. at 910.
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death of a human fetus, the court interpreted the term “person” in the wrongful
death statute to include a fetus.282 The court limited its holding to the facts of
the case, that involved the death of a viable, nine month fetus and postponed
decision on whether a cause of action would likewise lie for the death of a
nonviable fetus.283
In 1995, the en banc panel of the Missouri Supreme Court determined that
an unborn, previable fetus is also a “person” within the meaning of the state
wrongful death statute.284 In Connor v. Monkem,285 the husband of a woman
killed in an auto accident was able to state a claim against the negligent
driver’s employer for the wrongful death of his wife and previable, unborn
child.286 The Court found that although a majority of other jurisdictions limit
recovery to viable, unborn children, the Missouri legislature intended to extend
the wrongful death statute to cover previable fetuses as well.287
b.

Criminal Liability for Prenatal Harm

Under common law, no crime exists if a child dies before birth; however, a
defendant may be held liable for murder if the child is born alive and later
dies.288 Many jurisdictions now allow for a criminal conviction absent a live
birth.289 In State v. Holcomb,290 Holcomb was convicted of murder in the first
degree and sentenced to two consecutive life sentences for strangling and
killing his girlfriend and her unborn, twenty-six week fetus.291 The court made

282. Id. at 909.
283. Id. at 911.
284. Connor v. Monkem Co., 898 S.W.2d 89, 93 (Mo. 1995) (en banc) (extending coverage to
an unborn four month fetus). The court relied on MO. REV. STAT. §1.205 (1986) that reads:
(1) The life of each human being begins at conception; (2) Unborn children have
protectable interests in life, health, and well-being; . . . the laws of this state shall be
interpreted and construed to acknowledge on behalf of the unborn child at every stage of
development, all the rights, privileges, and immunities available to other persons . . .
subject only to the Constitution of the United States . . . .
Id. §1.205. Interestingly, this is the same statute addressed in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services in which the Supreme Court deferred judgment on the statute’s constitutionality until
Missouri courts had the opportunity to interpret it. Webster, 492 U.S. at 506-07.
285. 898 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. 1995) (en banc).
286. Id. at 92-93.
287. Id. “[T]he question before us is one of statutory construction, [therefore] we must be
more sensitive to legislative direction and less sensitive to our own evaluation of policy . . . [T]he
legislature’s [intent] . . . must be accorded greater weight than the many other and obvious
difficulties associated with the type of claim here . . . .” Id. at 93.
288. See generally Wasserstrom, supra note 276.
289. Id.
290. 956 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
291. Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d at 288-89.
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clear that a murderer of any fetus could be convicted of either involuntary
manslaughter or murder.292
2.

Resolving the Conflict Between the “Rights” of a Fetus under
Infanticide and Abortion Law

While Missouri’s infanticide argument is somewhat more persuasive than
those states outlawing partial birth abortion through abortion statutes, any
proposal to expand infanticide prohibitions to include procedures used to abort
“partially born” fetuses will likely fail. While the state clearly has a legitimate
interest in the potential life of a fetus, that right is not absolute until the infant
has separated from the mother at birth. Even while emphasizing the state’s
compelling interest in a viable fetus, the Supreme Court has nevertheless
constrained the state’s ability to protect the fetus when the interests of the fetus
conflict with the mother’s life or health. The exercise of constitutional line
drawing is difficult and at times imprecise; however, the act of “birth”
currently serves as a clear line of demarcation for the recognition of
constitutional rights and personhood.
Unfortunately, neither the states nor the federal government have reached
consensus on the legal status of a living fetus. As previously mentioned, both
the Supreme Court and Missouri state courts have upheld legislation
recognizing that “unborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and
well-being . . . [and that] at every stage of development, [unborn children shall
have] all the rights, privileges, and immunities available to other persons.”293
The Court in Webster upheld such legislation in so much as Missouri courts
might choose to expand tort and probate protection to unborn fetuses.294 They
deferred for another day the resolution of any conflict the law may have with
abortion rights.295 Following Webster, homicide convictions in Missouri for
the murder of a fetus have only been brought against third parties with the
intent to harm the fetus and/or the mother. Presumably in those cases the
interests of the mother and the fetus were in harmony. As elaborated in
Holcomb, the fact that a mother may have a constitutionally protected right to
obtain an abortion does not preclude the prosecution of a third party for murder

292. Id. at 290. The court specifically rejected the defendant’s argument that he should only
be convicted of a misdemeanor, the penalty for an illegal abortion. Id. at 292. The court
determined, “[t]he fact that a mother of a pre-born child may have been granted certain legal
rights to terminate the pregnancy does not preclude the prosecution of a third party for murder in
the case of a killing of a child not consented to by the mother.” Id. at 291. See also State v.
Kenney, 973 S.W.2d 536, 545 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (finding an unborn child to be a person for
purposes of the first degree assault statute).
293. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
294. Webster, 492 U.S. at 506.
295. Id.
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of her fetus.296 When analyzed solely in the context of Missouri feticide law,
the Infant’s Protection Act appears to be entirely consistent with previous
decisions. In fact, in some respects it could be considered less controversial in
that it bans murder of an infant already in the process of being born, as
opposed to banning the murder of a previable fetus still within the womb.
Only when considered in combination with abortion law does the Infant’s
Protection Act become troublesome. The Supreme Court determined in Roe v.
Wade that Fourteenth Amendment protection does not extend to the unborn.297
The Court partially relied on the fact that at that time many areas of state law
did not afford legal protection to a fetus prior to birth.298 Given that state law
has evolved to protect the unborn, Roe’s holding has been undermined to some
degree; however, there is no reason to believe that the Court will abandon that
determination in the near future. The Court in Casey explicitly established the
relevant constitutional inquiry when a state abortion law designed to protect
the potential life of a fetus was in conflict with a woman’s liberty or privacy
rights under the Constitution.299 The Court considered whether a state law
imposes an undue burden on a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy
prior to fetal viability.300 “[V]iability marks the earliest point at which the
State’s interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative
ban on nontherapeutic abortions.”301
While the Court appears content to allow states the ability to extend greater
protection to a fetus under state law than is available to it under the
Constitution, the inconsistent approaches should be resolved. This author does
not advocate a particular resolution, yet it is nonsensical to continue allowing
an unborn fetus to be a “person” entitled to protection in some situations yet
not in others, particularly under criminal homicide statutes. Clearly a
difference exists between a mother’s relationship with her fetus in the abortion
context and a third party’s “relationship” to the fetus under homicide and
wrongful death statutes; however, it is illogical to suggest that the status of a
fetus as a “person” depends on who terminates its life.
VI. PROPOSED CHANGES TO MISSOURI’S STATUTE
The question is not so much whether it would be constitutional to outlaw a
particular procedure on viable fetuses, but rather how a legislature must draft
the statute in order to pass constitutional muster. Missouri has included several

296. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
297. 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
298. Id. at 161-62. See also supra note 57 and accompanying text.
299. Casey, 505 U.S. at 876-77.
300. Id. at 877.
301. Id. at 860 (“Whenever . . . [viability] may occur, the attainment of viability may continue
to serve as the critical fact, just as it has done since Roe . . . .”).
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key elements in the Infant’s Protection Act; however, the Act should be
reworded so as to ensure constitutionality. Most importantly, the Act must
include an exception for the health of the mother. It need not specifically
define the meaning of “health” to include both physical and mental aspects of
health. The state may dispute whether mental health should be excepted from
regulation and may argue its case in the courts. The courts are the appropriate
forums to determine the constitutional requirements for a health exception.
Secondly, while not necessary, it would be wise to more specifically define
“living infant” such that when applicable to “partially born” “living infants”
the Act only applies to viable “living infants.” Viability should be defined by
using the definition approved in Roe v. Wade.302 Also, in order to simplify the
terms of the Act, it would be advisable to both specifically name the procedure
to be outlawed and specify which medical procedures will remain legal.
Clearly many legislatures are concerned that should they name the specific
abortion procedure to be outlawed, then abortion providers need only alter
their “partial birth abortion” technique so as to avoid penalty under the statute.
While those concerns may be well founded, it would be more prudent to avoid
vagueness concerns and later consider amending the statute should those
concerns become a reality.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is abundantly clear that where there is a political “will” there may be a
“way.” That “way” may seem like a fierce football rivalry in the abortion
arena, but given the convergence of morals, politics, religious beliefs, science,
individual rights and states’ rights, perhaps it cannot be otherwise. The
Supreme Court may offer some guidance in the partial birth abortion debate in
the near future. The Court recently granted certiorari to consider the
constitutionality of the Nebraska partial birth abortion law at issue in Carhart
v. Stenberg.303 The grant of certiorari is limited to the two following issues: 1)
whether the Eighth Circuit’s broad reading of Nebraska’s partial birth abortion
ban violates fundamental rules of statutory construction and federalism, and 2)
whether the lower court misapplied the Casey “undue burden” standard when it
found Nebraska’s law to be unconstitutional.304 Perhaps the Court will take the
opportunity to further elaborate and clarify the confusion surrounding the
correct application of the Casey undue burden standard. With clearer guidance
from the Court, perhaps the “Peanuts characters” will finally settle their

302. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160 (defining viability as the “potential[] . . . to live outside of the
mother’s womb, albeit with artificial aid.”).
303. 192 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3338 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2000)
(No. 99-830).
304. Petitioner’s Brief, Stenberg v. Carhart, 2000 WL 228615 (No. 99-830).
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differences. Until that time, Missouri’s Infant’s Protection Act seems doomed
to fail.
JENNIFER LANDRUM ELLIOTT

